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Incentives to lenders to provide financin~
to borrowers who are the subject of banlc

By Paul M. Baisier and David G. Epstein**

A

bankruptcy debtor ;, not viewed by most lenders as a desirable customer. Most lenders arc un-

derstandably reluctant to extend credit to such a borrower. This reluctance compounds the difficulties of a
bankruptcy debtor. Without new financing, the cash needs of a debtor often will cause the debtor's assets to be
liquidated, thereby foreclosing any hope of reorganization and defeating the rehabilitative purposes of the
Bankruptcy Code. 1
To counter the understandable reluctance of financial institutions to
lend to bankruptcy debtors, section
364 of the Bankruptcy Code provides
incentives to lenders to provide financing to borrowers who are the subject of bankruptcy cases. Section 364
enables a debtor to obtain credit by
granting a prospective lender a variety
of different incentives, some of which
are not available on a nonconsensual
basis outside of the bankruptcy context. 2

Section 364

Section 364 (a)

T

he starting point for analyzing the provisions for postpetition financing in the
Bankruptcy Code is section 364(a). 3
Section 364(a) provides that a debtor
may obtain unsecured credit in the
"ordinary course of business" without
approval of the bankruptcy court.
This treatment is consistent with the
Chapter 11 concept of the "debtor-inpossession," that allows the debtor to
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continue to operate its business in the
ordinary course. 4 To qualify under
section 364(a), the credit must fund
qn expense that is otherwise eligible
for treatment as an administrative expense under section 503(b). To be so
eligible, the credit must be extended
to fund an expense that is not allowable under section 502(f) and is an
"actual, necessary cost [or] expense of
preserving the estate."5

Section 364(b)
A consequence of the requirement
that the credit be extended in the "ordinary course of business" is that the
financing provided under section
364(a) is usually limited to trade credit. Other lenders do not generally rely
on this section, as whether extensions
of credit are made "in the ordinary
course of business" is a fact-based
question that is not always easily answered. Moreover, section 364(b) provides a safer method for creditors who
desire to extend postpetition unsecured credit to do so. Section 364(b)
eliminates the need to make the diffiFederal Bar News &Journal

rptcy cases.
cult determination whether particular . lien on property of the debtor that is
credit is extended in the "ordinary
senior to existing liens on such propercourse of business." Section 364 (b) alty pursuant to section 364(d). The
lows the postpetition debtor to obtain
granting of such a lien is, however,
unsecured credit outside of the ordisubject to several statutory conditions.
nary course of business. However, secFirst, as with section 364(c), the debtor
tion 364(b) requires the approval of must prove that it cannot obtain credit
the bankruptcy court after notice and
on an any less intrusive basis (i.e.,
a hearing. 6
through the use of sections 364(a),
(b), or (c)). 7 Additionally, the debtor
Section 364(c)
must prove that the interest of any
A debtor often cannot obtain suffilender whose lien is to be primed is
cient credit on an unsecured basis to
"adequately protected. "8
maintain business operations. Sections 364(c) and 364(d) allow debtors
Section 364(e)
to obtain credit on a priority basis or
Finally, lenders who have advanced
by the granting ofliens on property of funds based on court orders granted
the debtor. More specifically, section
under section 364 are protected on
364(c) empowers the debtor to grant
appeal by section 364(e). Debtors gena postpetition lender either (1) a prierally have an immediate need for
ority over all administrative expenses
postpetition financing. Lenders would
of the case, (2) a security interest in
be reluctant to advance funds immediunencumbered property of the
ately ifa section 364(b) or (c) priority
or a section 364(c) or (d) lien could
debtor, or (3) a junior lien on already
encumbered property. Lending under
be eliminated retroactively by the resection 364(c) often involves the grant
versal on appeal of the order granting
of more than one of these incentives
the priority or lien securing the ad(i.e., a junior lien and priority over advance. Consequently, to encourage
ministrative expenses for any deficienlending, the priorities and liens grantcy in the security). Section 364(c), like
ed to lenders pursuant to section 364
section 364 (b), requires court apare protected from reversal on appeal
proval after notice and a hearing. Furby section 364 (e), so long as the order
ther, to be able to grant the priorities
granting the priority or lien was
and liens provided in section 364(c), a
sought in "good faith" and so long as
debtor must prove to the court that it
a stay pending the appeal was not obcannot obtain the needed credit on
tained by a party opposing the grant
an unsecured basis.
of the priority or lien.

Section 364(d)
If even the priorities and liens provided by section 364(c) are insufficient
to entice potential lenders to provide
sufficient financing to a debtor, the
debtor, with court approval, may obtain credit by granting the lender a
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Cross-Collateralization9
or a variety of business and
legal reasons, debtor-in-possession financing is often
provided by one of the debtor's prepetition lenders. Common reasons for

F

this practice include the familiarity of
existing lenders with the debtor and
its business and the lack of economic
justification for a postpetition loan by
a lender lacking a preexisting stake in
the debtor.
In agreeing to lend postpetition
funds, an undersecured 10 prepetition
lender frequently attempts to improve
its position on its prepetition claim. For
example, in In re SaylYrook Manufacturing
Company, Inc., 11 the debtor owed Manufacturers Hanover $34 million prepetition. This prepetition obligation was secured by prepetition collateral with a
value of less than $10 million. Manufacturers Hanover agreed to lend the
debtor $3 million postpetition to facilitate its reorganization, in exchange for
a lien on all of the debtor's property,
both prepetition and postpetition,
given to secure both the debtor's prepetition and postpetition obligations to
Manufacturers Hanover.

Definition
Securing prepetition debt with both
prepetition and postpetition collateral
is generally referred to as "cross-collateralization." The term cross-collateralization appears nowhere in the Bankruptcy Code. The Saybrook opinion
refers to an earlier Second Circuit decision, In re Texlon Corp., 12 as the first appellate court decision to use the phrase
"cross-collateralization. "13 The SaylYrook
Court describes the Manufacturers
Hanover loan as "Texlon-type cross-collateralization."14 The phrase "Texlontype cross-collateralization" refers to
granting a security interest in postpetition assets to secure prepetition obligations. By contrast, a debtor might
also grant a lien on prepetition assets
to secure the loans of a postpetition
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lender. This "non-Texlon-type of crosscollateralization" is expressly authorized by section 364(c). 15 The phrase
"cross-collateralization" as used hereinafter will only include Texlon-type
cross-collateralization.

Texlon
1. Facts. The Texlon case was governed
by the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. When
Texlon filed its Chapter XI petition,
Manufacturers Hanover was owed
more than $700,000. The collateral securing the loan was valued at less than
the amount of this obligation. On the
date of the petition, the bankruptcy
court entered an ex parte order authorizing Texlon to enter into factoring
and loan agreements with Manufacture rs Hanover. The financing order
granted Manufacturers Hanover a security interest in Texlon's prepetition
and postpetition assets to secure both
the postpetition loan and the prepetition obligation. Within ten weeks, the
Texlon Chapter XI case was converted
to Chapter VII. In the postpetition
interval, Manufacturers Hanover advanced $667,000 to the debtor. After
repaying the $667,000 postpetition advance, Texlon had $267,000 in remaining assets.
If the cross-collateralization provision had been upheld, all of that
$267,000 would have gone to Manufacturers Hanover in payment of its
prepetition unsecured claim. The
Chapter VII trustee requested the
bankruptcy court to modify its original financing order to delete the
cross-collateralization provision. The
bankruptcy court agreed with the
trustee that the cross-collateralization
provision should not have been approved. It stated that the cross-collateralization clause would violate the
basic bankruptcy principle of equality
of treatment for like situated creditors
without statutory authority. The court
indicated that it would not enter such
orders in the future, but declined to
vacate the original order. 16
2. Holding. The Second Circuit reversed the bankruptcy court; however,
the holding was limited to the facts of
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Texlon-particularly the fact of an ex
parte hearing.
A financing scheme so contrary to
the spirit of the Bankruptcy Act
should not have been granted by
an ex parte order, where the
bankruptcy court relies solely on
representations by a debtor-in-possession that credit essential to the
maintenance of operations is not
otherwise obtainable. The debtorin-possession is hardly neutral. 17

Texlon is generally recognized only for
this narrow holding, although Judge
Friendly's dictum, questioning the validity of cross-collateralization, is also
often cited.

Ellingsen and Adams Apple
After Texlon, two other courts of appeal avoided deciding the validity of
cross-collateralization clauses. In In re
Ellingsen MacLean Oil Company, 18 and
In re Adams Apple, Inc., 19 the Sixth and
Ninth Circuits were confronted with
challenges to cross-collateralization
clauses. Both the Sixth and Ninth Circuits ruled that section 364(e) mooted the appeals of debtor-in-possession
financing orders containing cross-collateralization clauses.
In Ellingsen, the postpetition lender
received, as part of a section 364 (c) financing order, an agreement from the
debtor not to challenge the lender's
prepetition security interests. The
Sixth Circuit determined that this provision was arguably covered by section
364(c), and stated that, even if it were
not, that fact would likely not take the
provision outside of the protections of
section 364(e), as long as that provision was purported to be granted
under section 364(c) and was obtained in good faith. 20 Although there
does not appear to have been any
cross-collateralization involved in the
364(c) order at issue in Ellingsen, the
court, in dicta, stated that "the mere
allowance of cross-collateralization in
some degree as a financing tool does
not deprive an order of section 364(e)
protection. "21
In Adams Appl£, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that cross-collateralization
was not expressly included in the list of

financing devices contained in section
364. The court then stated that crosscollateralization is covered by section
364; however, the court cautioned that
its conclusion that cross-collateralization clauses were "authorized" under
section 364 was limited to the context
of section 364(e) mootness and was
not intended to prevent a panel of the
court from holding in the future that
cross-collateralization was illegal per se:
"[b] ecause the bankruptcy judge
thought that cross-collateralization was
legal and entered an order to that effect upon which the creditor relied, we
conclude that the creditor should receive the protection of section 364(e)
in this case. "22

Vanguard
Perhaps the strongest decision endorsing cross-collateralization is In re
Vanguard Diversified, Inc. 23 In Vanguard,
the court adopted a four-part test proposed by Benjamin Weintraub and
Professor Alan Resnick. 24 Under that
test, cross-collateralization should be
permitted if: ( 1) the debtor will not
survive without the loan; (2) the
debtor is unable to get loans from alternative sources on acceptable terms;
( 3) the lender who proposes to make
the loan will not agree to the loan
without cross-collateralization; and ( 4)
the loan is in the best interest of creditors.25 This test is similar to that employed in granting a senior lien under
section 364(d), although in this situation the focus is on the protection of
all unsecured creditors, rather than
on the protection of one or more secured creditors.

Saybrook
In Saybrook, the Eleventh Circuit became the first circuit court to rule directly on the propriety of cross-collateralization. The Eleventh Circuit in
Saybrook concluded that cross-collateralization "is an impermissible means
of obtaining postpetition financing" 26
and explained:
[w] e conclude that cross-collateralization is inconsistent with the
bankruptcy law for two reasons.
First, cross-collateralization is not
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authorized as a means of postpetition financing under Section 364.
Second, cross-collateralization is
beyond the scope of the Bankruptcy Court's inherent equitable
powers because it is directly contrary to the fundamental priority
scheme of the Bankruptcy Code. 27

Goold
After Say&rook, the District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois, in Of
ficial Committee of Unsecured Creditors v.
Goold Electronics Corp., 28 declined to follow the holding in Say&rook that crosscollateralization was per se impermissible. Instead, it invited the bankruptcy
court on remand to establish a test that
would "weigh the equities" in approving or declining to approve lending
that included cross-collateralization. It
suggested the test applied in Vanguard,
but clearly indicated that that test was
not required, and that, on remand, the
bankruptcy court was free to establish a
test of its own.

Contrast with Doctrine of

showing. If that is the case, all that is
required is the identification by courts
of the factors that might demonstrate
a "necessity" for those purposes. For
example, the Vanguard factors seem to
establish a certain "necessity" that
might justify cross-collateralization.
Similarly, the bankruptcy court in
Goold may develop such a list of factors. In any event, to the extent that
"necessity" is valid justification for the
payment of prepetition claims, a factored approach to the approval of
cross-collateralization that encompasses the concept of necessity may be the
best approach to deciding the propriety of cross-collateralization case-bycase. Such an approach, conducted
under the statutory authority of sections 105 30 and 364, also would likely
balance the equality of distribution
and reorganization objectives of the
Bankruptcy Code as well as is possible
in the difficult cases in which crosscollateralization is an issue.

Appeals of Financing Orders

Necessity /Conclusion
In addition to being inconsistent
with the prior holdings in Ellingsen
and Adams Apple, and the subsequent
holding in Goold, the Say&rook holding
seems inconsistent with holdings in
another developing area of bankruptcy law, the doctrine of "necessity."
Courts increasingly are permitting
Chapter 11 debtors to make postpetition/ preconfirmation payments on
prepetition claims to suppliers or employees, finding that such payments
are necessary for the debtor to continue its operations. 29 The holding in
Saybrook regarding cross-collateralization, which prohibits cross-collateralization because its allows the collateralization of prepetition claims, thereby improving their chances of being
paid, seems inconsistent with these
cases, which authorize the actual payment of prepetition claims. If the payment of prepetition claims, in violation of the priorities established in
section 507, can be justified by some
sort of "necessity," it stands to reason
that cross-collateralization may be justifiable on the basis of some similar
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T

he holding in Saybrook that
cross-collateralization is per
se impermissible is significant. Equally significant, however, is
the Say&rook approach to appellate review of financing orders. 31
Postpetition financing is generally a
matter of some urgency. The debtor
often needs immediate court approval
of debtor-in-possession financing so
that it can obtain the financing quickly and continue in business. If an appellate court could overturn the protections granted to the lender by the
bankruptcy judge in her order, most
lenders would not be willing to fund
the loan until all issues concerning its
loan had been fully litigated and appealed. To ensure that lenders are
willing to fund postpetition loans
quickly, section 364(e) provides that
the protections granted to postpetition lenders under a section 364 financing order cannot be later overturned, unless the lenders acted in
bad faith or the order is stayed.
Section 364(e) provides

The reversal or modification on
appeal of an authorization under
this section to obtain credit or
incur debt or of a grant under this
section of a priority or lien, does
not affect the validity of any debt
so incurred, or any priority or lien
so granted, to an entity that extended such credit in good faith,
whether or not such entity knew
of the pendency of the appeal, unless such authorization and the incurring of such debt, or the granting of such priority or lien, were
stayed pending appeal.
Professor James J. White recently
described the purpose of section
364(e) and the corresponding provision in section 363, section 363(m), as
follows:
Necessarily bankruptcy is a contentious setting; almost always
some party will believe that a proposed sale under Section 363 or a
loan under Section 364 is contrary
to its interest and can argue that it
is a violation of the provisions of
the Code. Since such sales under
Section 363 and loans under Section 364 are usually made in the
presence of such inchoate threat or
challenges, the drafters feared that
the buyers would not buy from sellers in bankruptcy and the lenders
would not lend to them. By foreclosing appeal - except where there
has been something tantamount to
bad faith - the Congress has taken
extraordinary measures to encourage purchases and loans. The general message of these sections is
that one must protest before the
bankruptcy judge, and if a person
is not successful there, must get a
stay pending the appeal, or forsake
his case. Even where the bankruptcy judge has misread the law or
granted an impermissible right to a
lender or buyer, the decision cannot be overturned on appeal if the
buyer purchased in good faith or
the lender made its loan in good
faith. 32
In general, the reported cases
under section 364(e) have been consistent with the above quotation from
Professor White. As discussed in Part
II, in Adams Apple, the Ninth Circuit
held that the mootness doctrine applied to an order permitting cross-col-
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lateralization despite the fact that
some courts had held cross-collateralization orders invalid. Also, in Ellingsen, the Sixth Circuit reached the
same result with respect to an order
barring challenges to the lender's
prepetition liens.

Saybrook and 364(e)
In Saybrook, the Eleventh Circuit
broke with the Sixth and Ninth Circuits on this issue. The court in Saybrook held that an appeal from a
bankruptcy court's order authorizing
cross-collateralization is not mooted
by section 364(e). In so ruling, Judge
Cox looked to the language of section
364(e) and certain articles written by
Professor Charles Tabb, rather than
considering the language of the Sixth
Circuit or the Ninth Circuit or the
writings of Professor White.
According to the Saybrook court, the
relevant phrase from section 364(e) is
the phrase "authorization under this
section." With respect to that language,
Professor Tabb wrote as follows:
The primary argument made that
lender-preference clauses are not
protected by Section 364(e) is that
Section 364( e), on its face, only
applies to authorizations to incur
debt or to obtain credit under this
section, and the granting of a priority or lien 'under this section,'
meaning, of course, Section 364.
It is undisputed that lender-preference clauses are not provided for
expressly anywhere in Section 364
(or anywhere else in the Code, for
that matter). The apparently
straightforward conclusion is that
Section 364(e) being limited by its
own terms to Section 364 financing orders, does not extend to
non-Section 364 financing clauses
such as lender-preference clauses.
This plain meaning argument is
consistent with the underlying
purposes of Section 364 (e). 33
Because the Saybrook court agreed
with Professor Tabb, it had to decide
whether cross-collateralization provisions were "authorized" by section
364. As discussed in Part II, it determined that they were not, and thus
the court held that section 364(e) did
not protect cross-collateralization pro-
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v1s10ns on appeal. Saybrook conflicts
with Adams Apple in holding that, for
section 364 (e) purposes, cross-collateralization is not authorized, and conflicts with Ellingsen in holding that
provisions that are not explicitly authorized by section 364 but that are
part and parcel of the financing are
not immune from review.

true in iight of the current tendency,
particularly in larger cases, for competitive pressures to force potential
postpetition lenders not to insist on
cross-collateralization. Resolution in
this area will have to await further developments in the case law.

Gap Period Financing under
Section 364

Florida West
After Saybrook, a bankruptcy court
in the Eleventh Circuit, in In re Florida
West Gateway, lnc., 34 applied the Saybrook holding regarding the availability
of section 364(e) protection very narrowly in upholding a mutual recognition of the prepetition extinguishment of certain claims as part of a section 364 financing agreement. In
Florida West, the court limited the Saybrook holding to cross-collateralization
provisions, holding that Saybrook is inapposite because "[the lender here] is
not collateralizing a prepetition claim.
Rather, the Trustee is acknowledging
that mutual obligations ... were cancelled prepetition. "35

Impact of Saybrook on Interpretation
of 364(e)
Saybrook has the potential to have a
significant impact on postpetition
lending practices. If taken to its logical extreme, any provision in a postpetition lending arrangement that does
not deal explicitly only with postpetition financing or the security therefor
is not protected by section 364(e) and
is subject to being overturned on appeal under the Saybrook analysis.
Lenders concerned about attacks on
their security interests, as well as
lenders concerned about potential
lender liability claims, would likely be
far more reluctant to "throw good
money after bad" if under the Saybrook
rule they could potentially not only
lose both the good and bad money,
but be sued after the case has concluded. Conversely, if the Saybrook
analysis is limited by subsequent
courts to appeals of cross-collateralization provisions, it will have a much
smaller impact on the practice of postpeti tion lending. This is especially

he issue of the availability of
cross-collateralization, and
the related issue of mootness under section 364( e), are raised
fairly frequently in voluntary business
bankruptcy cases. In contrast, the availability of postpetition financing pursuant to section 364 is usually not an
issue in involuntary bankruptcy cases.
Most involuntary cases are either dismissed or have an order for relief entered fairly quickly, leaving little time
for an involuntary debtor to seek and
obtain postpetition financing. Moreover, because involuntary filings are
not planned by the debtor, the debtor
in an involuntary case generally has
not arranged postpetition financing
prior to its filing, a practice that is
quite common in voluntary filings and
quite necessary if the financing is to be
utilized early in the bankruptcy case. 36
In those involuntary cases in which
the debtor does seek credit during the
"gap period, "37 the threshold issue of
the ability of an involuntary debtor to
utilize section 364 is likely to be raised
by those opposing the financing. In
such cases, the party or parties that object to the involuntary debtor's use of
section 364 may claim that, as the involuntary debtor has not consented to
the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy
court and acceded to the burdens of
operating under the supervision of the
bankruptcy court, it should not be allowed to utilize any of the benefits of
the Bankruptcy Code. Conversely, the
debtor may argue that its access to
credit has been seriously impaired, if
not destroyed, by the filing of an unwarranted bankruptcy petition against
it and, consequently, it should be able
to use section 364 to restore it to its
prepetition credit status.

T
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Neither of these two viewpoints is
entirely correct. Instead, a middle
ground is the most easily supported by
sound public policy and by the language and structure of the Bankruptcy Code.

Roxy Roller
There is only one reported case that
expressly deals with the issue of
whether an involuntary debtor can
utilize the benefits of section 364. In
that case, In re Roxy Roller Rink Joint
Venture, 38 the bankruptcy court faced
an unusual set of facts.
The Roxy Roller case began as an involuntary Chapter 11 case in which the
debtor required $120,000 to avoid immediate liquidation. An insider offered
to advance the $120,000 and, as a condition of the proposed financing,
sought priority over administrative expenses and a first priority lien in an unencumbered lease to secure the financing, both pursuant to section 364(c).
At an interim hearing, the court granted the debtor authority to borrow
$15,000 from the insider, such sum to
be granted administrative expense priority and to be secured by an interest
in the lease. At the final hearing on the
financing, the court granted the
debtor's motion regarding the postpetition financing in toto from the bench,
and debtor's counsel offered to present an order authorizing the financing for the court's signature later in
the week. The insider subsequently
made the loan, but the debtor's counsel failed to deliver the order to the
court and also failed to have the debtor
and the lender execute any loan or security documents. Subsequently, all of
the debtor's assets were sold, the case
was converted to a Chapter 7, and the
lender petitioned the bankruptcy court
for an order nunc pro tune authorizing
the financing.
Faced with the foregoing, the Roxy
Roller court first determined that the
lack of loan documentation prevented
any finding that the insider /lender
had a lien on the lease. 39 The court further determined that, notwithstanding
its previous ruling authorizing the
debtor to enter into the financing, it
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should not enter the order, nunc pro
tune, authorizing the financing and
granting the insider/lender a claim
with priority over administrative expenses, as it was now of the view that an
involuntary debtor was not authorized
to utilize section 364( c) at all. 40

Roxy Roller Analysis of 364(a)
After providing an overview of the
authority of an involuntary debtor to
operate and the avoidability of certain
transfers made by the involuntary
debtor during the gap period, 41 the
Roxy Roller court turned to an analysis
of the availability of section 364 to involuntary debtors. The court first
looked at section 364(a) and made
four findings specific to that section.
The court first noted that section
364(a) requires that, in order to borrow under that section, the debtor
must be operating under, inter alia, either section 721 or section 1108 of the
Code. 42 Second, it found that the involuntary debtor's authority to operate derives from section 303 (f), and
not from either section 721 or section
1108. 43 Third, the court found that
the utilization of section 364(a) by an
involuntary debtor to create an
administrative expense priority for a
gap period creditor would bring section 364(a) into direct conflict with
sections 502(f) and 507(a) (2), which
provide priority directly behind administrative expenses for the
involuntary debtor's gap period "ordinary course" expenses. 44 Finally, the
court held that an involuntary debtor
is not a "trustee" so as to be able to
borrow. 45 As a consequence of these
findings, the Roxy Roller court held
that section 364(a) is not available to
an involuntary debtor. 46
Roxy Roller Analysis of Section
364(b)
The Roxy Roller court next considered the availability of section 364(b)
to an involuntary debtor. The leading
multi-volume bankruptcy treatise, Collier on Bankruptcy, states that section
364(b) credit is available to an involuntary debtor. More specifically, Collier states:
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In an involuntary case credit incurred outside of the ordinary
course of business before entry of
the order for relief must be authorized by the court under Section
364(b). Such credit is entitled to
priority as an expense of administration under Section 503 (b) ( 1).
Section 502(f) applies only to
credit obtained in the ordinary
course of business during the so
called involuntary gap period, and
therefore will not disqualify credit
authorized under Section 364(b)
from priority under Sections
503(b)(l) and507(a)(l). 47
In disagreeing with Collier, the Roxy
Roller court took issue with the statement in Collier that section 502(£) applies only to "ordinary course" transactions, and thus does not present a
conflict with section 364(b) that disqualifies an involuntary debtor from
obtaining section 364(b) financing.
The Roxy Roller opinion attacked this
statement in two ways: first, it said that
section 502(f) provides "no support"
for Collier's assertion. 48 Section 502(f),
however, provides ample support for
such an assertion, as it deals only with
"ordinary course" transactions, in contrast to section 364(b), which deals
with transactions outside the "ordinary course." Second, the Roxy Roller
opinion stated that allowing the use
by an involuntary debtor of section
364(b), but not 364(a), made little
sense, as there was not a "sufficient
distinction" between the two sections. 49 This statement makes little
sense, as section 364(b) requires court
approval, while section 364(a) does
not. The imposition of the requirement of court approval allows for regulation by the court of section 364(b)
credit extensions and would seem to
provide a "sufficient distinction" between the sections.

Roxy Roller Analysis of 364(c)
In its discussion of section 364(b),
the Roxy Roller court also considered a
question critical to the section 364( c)
superpriority that the debtor was seeking: does the involuntary debtor have
the status of a "trustee" during the
gap period? Paragraphs (a), (b), (c),
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and ( d) of section 364 all use the term
"trustee." An involuntary debtor can
make use of these paragraphs only if it
has the status of a "trustee." On that
question, the Roxy Roller court held
that, although section 1107 equates
the powers of a debtor-in-possession
with those of a "trustee", and an involuntary debtor is a debtor-in-possession
pursuant to section 1101 (1), the involuntary debtor could not be a
"trustee," as its freedom to operate
provided by section 303(£) was inconsistent with the obligations of a
"trustee. "50 Having concluded that an
involuntary debtor is not a "trustee,"
the Roxy Roller court held that neither
section 364(b) nor section 364(c) was
available to an involuntary debtor
and, consequently, denied the
debtor's motion for an order nunc pro
tunc. 51 Despite that holding, the Roxy
Roller court did hold that the insider/
lender should be paid $15,000 pursuant to its interim order, as that
order had never been appealed and
was immune from reversal pursuant to
section 364 ( e). 52

Alternative Analysis
The Roxy Roller holding that an involuntary debtor is not a "trustee" for
purposes of section 364 appears inconsistent with the language of section 101 (12), section 1101, and section 1107. Section 101 (12) defines
"debtor" as an entity against which a
case has been "commenced." It explicitly does not limit the definition of
debtor to an entity that has commenced a case itself. Section 1101
makes any "debtor" a "debtor-in-possession," unless a trustee has been appointed. Finally, section 1107 allows a
"debtor-in-possession" to utilize all the
rights and powers of a "trustee."
Following this analysis, an involuntary debtor is a "trustee" and, provided that it can meet the other section
364 requirements, is eligible to utilize
sections 364(b), ( c), and ( d). It cannot utilize section 364(a), as the Roxy
Roller court held, but not for the reasons that the Roxy Roller court suggested (i.e., that the involuntary debtor
does not operate under section 1108,

that the involuntary debtor is not a
trustee, and that allowing such a priority would conflict with the priority
otherwise assigned under section
502 (f)). Instead, it is the need for the
expense to be "allowable under section 503(b)(1)" that prevents the use
of section 364(a) by an involuntary
debtor.
The credit that is available under
section 364(a) is that obtained in the
ordinary course of business and allowable under section 503 (b) ( 1). Credit
is only allowable under section
503 (b) ( 1) if it is does not represent a
claim allowed under section 502 (f). A
claim allowed under section 502(£) includes any claim that arises in an involuntary case in the ordinary course
of the debtor's business and prior to
the entry of an order for relief or the
appointment of a trustee. Consequently, unless a trustee has been appointed, section 364(a) is not available to an involuntary debtor 53 because any claim that arises in the ordinary course of an involuntary debtor's
business (the first requirement to be
eligible for section 364(a) treatment)
is eligible for section 502(£) treatment
and thus does not fulfill the other requirement for section 364(a) treatment (because it is not otherwise allowable under section 503 (b) ( 1)).
Allowing an involuntary debtor to
utilize sections 364 (b), 54 ( c), and ( d),
and, if a trustee has been appointed,
section 364(a), is consistent not only
with the language of the Bankruptcy
Code but also with fundamental
considerations of fairness. An involuntary debtor has been thrust into a
bankruptcy against its will. Its credit is
likely to be damaged, if not destroyed.
Its cash needs will have increased, as
all of its suppliers are likely to have
put it on COD. It is not fair to ask the
involuntary debtor to shoulder these
burdens while not allowing it to obtain any sort of financing other than
ordinary course trade credit. This is
particularly true when one considers
that, other than credit granted under
section 364(d) and certain 364(c) priorities that have no meaning outside
of bankruptcy, 55 all of the priorities
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and security interests that can be
granted to a creditor under section
364 would have been available to the
involuntary debtor for granting to
creditors outside of bankruptcy. The
fairness of this availability is further
enhanced when one considers that all
of the types of financing available
under this analysis must be approved
by some third party (the court with respect to section 364(b), (c), and (d),
and the trustee in the limited cases in
which section 364(a) is available).
The foregoing analysis presents at
least one conceptual difficulty: it only
applies to involuntary Chapter 11
cases. A debtor-in-possession is defined in section llOl, which only applies in Chapter 11. 56 Further, a
debtor-in-possession has the powers of
a trustee pursuant to section 1107,
which again only applies in Chapter
11 cases. 57 Chapter 7 has no parallel
provision that grants the Chapter 7 in-

voluntary debtor the powers of a
trustee and would thus allow it to utilize section 364. Additionally, an actual Chapter 7 trustee is not appointed
in an involuntary case until an order
for relief is entered. 58 Consequently,
an involuntary Chapter 7 debtor can
never be a trustee, nor would a trustee
automatically be appointed during the
gap period of an involuntary Chapter
7 case; thus, it would seem that an involuntary Chapter 7 debtor could not
borrow under any part of section 364.
Despite the foregoing, a Chapter 7
involuntary debtor can access section
364 by taking one of two possible additional steps. First, an involuntary
Chapter 7 debtor can move to convert
the case to a Chapter 11 case, opening
up the availability of credit. 59 Although conversion does cause an
order for relief to be entered, 60 the involuntary debtor can always move to
dismiss the case for "cause" after the

conversion and borrowing. 61 Alternatively, if the involuntary debtor is
unwilling to seek conversion, it can
still obtain section 364 financing by
first seeking the appointment of an interim trustee. 62

(1984). The use of the cash collateral
alone is, however, rarely sufficient to
meet the cash needs of a debtor over
the course of a Chapter 11 case.
"The Bankruptcy Code contemplates
that a Chapter 11 debtor will continue
to operate its business and manage its
own affairs. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1107, 1108.
This is true in both voluntary and involuntary Chapter 11 cases. A Chapter 11
debtor in such a situation is called a
"debtor-in-possession." 11 U.S.C. §
1101 (1). Although the Code permits the
appointment of an independent trustee
in a Chapter 11 case to run the business
when fraud, dishonesty or gross mismanagement is alleged (see 11 U.S.C. §§
1104, 1108), it is generally difficult to
satisfy the standards for trustee appointment. By contrast, a trustee is automatically appointed in a voluntary Chapter 7
case. 11 U.S.C. §§ 701, 702. In an involuntary Chapter 7 case, the trustee is not
appointed until an order for relief is entered. See 11 U.S.C. § 701. A Chapter 7
trustee is authorized to operate the business during the liquidation. 11 U.S.C. §
721.
5
11 u.s.c. § 503.
6
"Notice and a hearing" is defined in
11U.S.C.§102(1).
7
11 U.S.C. § 364(d) (1).
8
11 U .S.C. § 364( d) (2); "adequate protection" is defined in 11 U.S.C. § 361.

9
Many commentators have discussed
cross-collateralization (e.g., RICHARD
BRODY, REORGANIZATION UNDER CHAPTER
11 OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE §6.03(2)
(1992); DAVID G. EPSTEIN, STEVE H. NICKLES, & JAMES j. WHITE, 1 BANKRUPTCY § 415 (1992); David Gray Carlson, Postpetition Security Interests Under the Bankruptcy
Code, 48 Bus. LAW 483 (1993); Mark
Prager, Financing the Chapter 11 Debtor:
The Lender's Perspective, 45 Bus. L. 2127,
2145-2147 (1990); Charles Tabb, A Critical Reappraisal of Cross-Collateralization in
Bankruptcy, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. l 09
(1986); Charles Tabb, Lender Preference
Clauses and the Destruction of Appealability
and Finality: Resolving A Chapter 11 Dilemma, 50 Omo ST. LJ. 109 (1989); Charles
Tabb, Emergency Preferential Orders In
Bankruptcy Reorganizations, 65 AM.
BANKR. LJ. 75 (1991).
10 "Undersecured" means that the
amount of debt is more than the value
of the property securing the debt.
11
963 F.2d 1490 (11th Cir. 1992).
12
596 F.2d 1092 (2nd Cir. 1979).
13
Saybrook, 963 F.2d at 1492.
14Id.
15
11 U.S.C. §§ 363(c), 363(d).
16
3 BCD 1013 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1977).
17
596 F.2d at 1098.
18
834 F.2d 599 (6th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 817 (1988).
19
829 F.2d 1484 (9th Cir. 1987).

Conclusion

T

his article addresses some of
the issues that arise from the
decision of the drafters of
the Bankruptcy Code to provide incentives to lend money to companies in
bankruptcy. We hope that the discussion of those issues herein is helpful.
It can, of course, be argued that
there should not be incentives to lend
to companies in bankruptcy. 63 It can
also be argued that there should not
be a Chapter 11 at all, or that the Atlanta Braves are not America's team,
or that Coca-Cola is not good for you.
But not by these authors.
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